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INTRODUCTION TO PART II: RITUAL PRACTICE
Thomas WIDLOK
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology
Initially the division of this collection of papers into two parts, labelled “symbolic
categories” and “ritual practice,” followed merely pragmatic reasons for grouping
papers which seemed to share some similarities. There was no explicit overarching
theory demanding such a division into two parts except for the entrenched habit
of anthropologists to divide the study of religion into that of “symbolism” and
“ritual.” This is not the place to review the history of this distinction in anthro-
pological thought. It should suffice to remind us that after protracted debates
about the primacy of myth (read: symbolic categories) versus that of cult (read:
ritual practices) studies of mythless rites - and riteless myths - were established
as fields of enquiry in their own right (see Stanner, 1989 [1966]). It was then con-
sidered common ground that symbolism could not be reduced to ritual activity
or vice-versa. As a consequence, research in the two fields developed more or less
independently of one another. In this context it is interesting to note that, at least
implicitly, the papers of this collection do comment on the relation between the two
fields of enquiry. Sugawara defines symbolism as that which is “non-tangible,” i. e.
that which cannot be heard, felt or smelled, after all hallmark properties of ritual
experiences. Conversely, in my own paper I note that ritual is not just a message
clothed in a particular format but that it adds something to whatever is being en-
coded symbolically. Or, to repeat R. Rappaport’s recent definition, ritual is “the
performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not
entirely encoded by the performers” (Rappaport, 1999:24, my emphasis).
Tsuru’s contribution in this volume gives very detailed evidence for the fact
that Pygmy rituals tend to move from their source of encoding once they have
been created. In fact the spirit rituals are exchanged and even sold in a way that
many practitioners of rituals in other religions would consider to be shocking and
disgraceful. This Pygmy example not only exemplifies that attitudes to rituals may
differ considerably in different contexts and that rituals need not be ceremonial to
proliferate. It also shows that unceremonially acquired rituals meet the desires
of their Pygmy performers and that they work well for those who practice them
even after they have been disconnected from their original setting. Whatever
meanings may be encoded in these rituals, a full encoding is not sought after by
practitioners who value these rituals to the extent that they spend their scarce
resources on acquiring something that was encoded by someone else who may not
even be known to them personally.
Symbols and rituals both play fundamental roles in human evolution. With
language comes not only the human ability to communicate meanings, to allow
for concerted social action and cooperation, to enlarge the pool of available in-
formation but also the possibility to create categories that have no necessary and
pre-determined link to empirical events and objects (Rappaport, 1999:21). In other
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words, language, including the ability to create symbols, not only creates new pos-
sibilities for humans but it also creates problems, above all the problem of lying and
of representations which are misleading and possibly harmful to social relations of
the present and detrimental to survival in the future. Rappaport argues that rit-
ual, with its emphasis on repetition and form and on disallowing the practitioners
to fully encode all meanings themselves, is the prime tool for dealing with lies.
Rituals provide some security and some supra-individual means for taking action
against the fact that for all that symbolically matters to humans, for instance the
existence of a God or the desirability of a moral order, there is the possibility of
formulating alternatives and the opportunity for lying (Rappaport, 1999:18). Here
the scope of individual human creations and imaginations has potentially harm-
ful effects. Unfortunately, Rappaport and many other theorists of religion discuss
their thesis only with regard to the ritual practices of Australian Aborigines and
other groups with particularly embroidered and elaborated religious systems but
not with regard to African hunter-gatherer cases. We consider this volume to be a
first step in redressing this bias.
Approaching ritual as a safety net against harmful lies, not only has repercussions
for our study of human origins but also for our study of current processes and of
the future prospects of human life. In my own contribution to this volume I have
outlined how the current changes that affect the Hai om medicine dance may
well produce a particular ritual format, with voluntary participation and forceful
ritual experiences that are connected to everyday life. I suggest that these may
well be very successful in a future civil society, at least as it is envisaged by some
social thinkers. “Enlightened” thought now takes relations and practices of hunter-
gatherers as a model, not as a romantic look back to unspoiled origins but rather
as a forward-looking attempt to deal with the most pressing problems at hand.
Dealing appropriately with the environment is probably the most urgent of these
problems and hunter-gatherers have a reputation for being successful in this field,
incorporating animals and plants into their considerations without disregarding
their own needs as human beings. The two contributions dealing with southern
African hunter-gatherers, Imamura’s and my own, underline that hunter-gatherers
are preoccupied with death and suffering. With rituals like the medicine dance,
the Hai om hope to be “on the winning side,” not necessarily overcoming “nature”
but also not forfeiting their peculiar situation as human beings.
Imamura, in her contribution about Gui and Gana rituals, emphasizes that
their rituals are typically not preventative but that they are curative as they deal
with events after they have occurred. That is to say, rituals are not an escape from
the “real world,” nor are they a means of preventing anxiety and wrong behaviour.
Rather, they are an everyday complement to the everyday social practice of the
Gui and Gana which is full of contingencies and choices that need to be made. The
rites of the Central Kalahari Bushmen do not exempt individuals from deciding as
to whether they want to eat the meat of a particular animal and whether they want
to enter an extra-marital sexual relationship but it helps them to mutually assure
one another that they have done everything in their power to prevent any negative
spin-offs that these decisions may entail. It is noteworthy that in the search for
useful means for carrying out their curative rituals the Gui and Gana do not
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primarily make use of wild plants, as some may expect from hunter-gatherers,
but of bodily fluids as well as of items taken from animal bodies. This suggests
that hunter-gatherer rituals are not marked off from the rituals of their neighbours
with regard to the substances that they use but rather through the way in which
they connect the experience of their own body, and other embodied entities, to
ritual procedures. At this point the papers on ritual seem to match closely the
contributions dealing with symbolic categories in the other part of this volume.
The contributions to this volume do not explicitly investigate the relation be-
tween ritual and cognition but at least implicitly anthropological research on ritual
suggests a new conception of cognition, namely as a process which is not limited to
the confines of individual human brains. The re-conceptualization of cognition as
a process of propagating representations across different media - of which human
brains are but one such medium amongst other embodied media - has recently been
formulated in detail by E. Hutchins and readers are referred to his work (Hutchins,
1995). Here it is sufficient to point out that the assumption that rituals do alter
reality and not only express meanings, need not lead to mysticism if we allow for
the possibility that the cognitive processes that do alter reality, make use of media
which are outside human brains, media which alter the representations that are
propagated across their particular forms. Cognitive problems get solved as repre-
sentations are transported, or propagated, across a number of media and as these
media are brought into correspondence with one another. Hutchins’ ethnographic
example is the navigation of a large ship a task solved by making use of spatial
arrangements, procedural routines, pre-defined social rules, tools and documents
created by humans of previous generations whose problem solving has been cap-
tured in these products and so forth. But what he writes about shared cognition
would equally well hold true if we were to consider rituals to be parts of larger
cognitive systems. Rituals may not be particular good media through which to
express oneself, even among hunter-gatherers where the distance between those
who create rituals and those who practice them is rather short. But rituals may
be very suitable tools to alter reality in a way that is desirable in the long run,
going beyond individual rationalism. Rappaport has pointed out that individual
rational thought is unlikely to bring about the necessary protection of ecological
resources and the desired balanced exchange between humans. Rituals, by con-
trast, because they take place in the public (or at least supra-individual) space
outside human brains, provide an opportunity for achieving ecological and social
effects that rational individual thought does not produce.
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